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Survivorship in international 
chain restaurants in Korea 
by Woo Gon Kim 
and Kaye Chon 
Several western chains have done well fn 
Korea, while others have withdrawn from 
the market. The authors summarize the 
current operational resub of western 
cha;n restaurants in Korea, report positive 
impacts of western foodservice ffms, and 
analyze the key elements leading to their 
survival and non-survival. Some lessons 
could be used as tools to establish 
entrance strategies of western chain 
restaurants in Korea as well as in other 
Asian markets. 
T he food service industry in Korea has grown consider- ably in size and changed 
significantly in composition over 
the last several decades. Within 
a decade the number of restau- 
rants increased more than three 
times, compared to the figure of 
154,000 units in 1988. Many of 
them are family-owned and are 
small conlmercial restaurants. 
Food away from home 
(FAFH) expenditures per house- 
hold in 1990 represented 21.6 
percent of total food spending 
expenditures, while that figure 
in Japan was approximately 25 
percent in the same period. In 
the U S . ,  FAFH expenditures per 
household in 1996 were approxi- 
mately 45 percent compared to 
35 percent in Korea.' 
Western chains enter 
I t  was not until the 1980s 
that Korean food service became 
a modern enterprise with strong 
management emphasis. In 1982 
Burger King signed a franchise 
contract and started operations 
in Korea. In the following two to 
seven years, American chain 
restaurants such as Wendy's and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), 
both in 1984, Pizza Hut in 1985, 
McDonald's in 1986, Denny's in 
1987, Coco's in 1988, and 
Domino's Pizza in 1990 pene- 
trated the Korean food service 
market. 
In the 1990s, the Korean food 
service firms that  made joint 
ventures or franchising agree- 
ments with western food service 
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firms shifted from their previous 
concentration on fast-food opera- 
tions toward more diverse 
concepts such as family restau- 
rants and dinner houses. Some 
of those restaurants are TGI 
Friday's that arrived in 1991, 
Ponderosa in 1992, Sizzler in 
1993, Popeye's in 1994, Tony 
Roma's, Bennigan's, and Planet 
Hollywood in 1995, Chili's and 
Hard Rock Cafe in 1996, 
Outback Steakhouse in 1997, 
and Starbucks in 1999. By 
providing casual and friendly 
service and a nice atmosphere 
not usually found in Korea, 
western restaurants became the 
food service equivalent of Levi's 
Jeans or Coca-Cola.2 
Chains are varied 
There were also some 
successful chains that are non- 
western restaurants. Lotteria, a 
Japanese hamburger restaurant 
chain, was the first chain restau- 
rant company introduced to Korea 
in 1979; its performance is ranked 
at the top of the fast-food segment 
in terms of the number of units and 
sales. Skylark, a successhl family 
reskaurant in Japan introduced in 
1993, emphasized a lower-end 
market positioning strategy by 
maintaining a lower average check 
of US$10. The average check of 
most western family restaurants in 
Korea ranged from US$13 to 
US$18. Marche, introduced in 
1997 fro111 Switzerland, became a 
strong competitor against the 
rapidly expanding American food 
service chains. 
Table 1 summarizes the 
status of American food semice 
chains operating in Korea a t  the 
end of 2000. Of the top 25 restau- 
rant chains ranked by Nation's 
Restaurant hrews in terms of U.S. 
sales, only 10 were represented in 
K ~ r e a . ~  Baskin-Robbins had the 
largest number of units in Korea, 
but most were very small. In 
terms of the number of units, 
McDonald's with 244 units was 
the second largest U.S. chain in 
Korea, followed by KFC and Pizza 
Hut, with 206 and 199 units, 
respectively. 
Within the segment of family 
and dinner house, Coco's with 
29 units was the leading 
restaurant, followed by TGI 
Friday's and Bennigan's with 17 
units and 10 units, respectively. 
In terms of sales volume, 
McDonald's was the number one 
chain with US$206.4 million, 
followed by Pizza Hut and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken with 
US$156.3 and US$145.3 million, 
respectively. Among family and 
dinner house restaurants, TGI 
Friday's was the leading chain 
with US$46.9 million, followed 
by Bennigan's and Coco's with 
US$31.5 million and US$23.4 
million, respectively 
It is interesting to note that 
Coco's, which commands a 
relatively tiny market share in 
the U.S. restaurant industry 
and which falls behind TGI 
Friday's and Outback Steak- 
house in terms of the number of 
units operating in the U.S. was 
ranked as one of the top 10 
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chains in Korea. In fact, Coco's, U.S. chain restaurants pene- 
the first U.S. family restaurant trated the Korean food service 
to open in Korea in 1988, enjoyed industry. Sizzler, Ponderosa, and 
the leadership position before Chili's operated only a few units 
other well-known, high-profile in Korea in 2000. 
Table 1 
U.S.-based food service chain 
restaurants in Korea in 2000 
Brand Rank in Number Korean U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. sales 
number ol units sales volume units units sales volume 
of units in Korea (US $Millions) rank number rank (USSMiI) 
Korea 
McDonald3 2 244 $206 4 2 12.629 1 $19,006 
Burger King 8 93 67.3 4 8.139 2 8.659 
Hardeep 10 23 15.6 16 2.673 13 2,139 
KFC 3 206 145.3 8 5.182 6 4.300 
Popeye's 6 160 108.6 32 1.165 35 986.4 
Pina Hut 5 199 156.3 5 8,084 5 5,000 
Domino's Pina 7 149 39.1 11 4.629 9 2,560 
Little Caesars Pina 14 6 N A 12 3.850 26 1.200 
Coco's 9 29 23.4 88 N A N A N A 
Ponderosa 17 3 N A 56 465 58 560.2 
Siuler 15 4 6.3 76 253 90  315 
Tony Roma's 15 4 9.0 85 157 100 297 
-
Benn~gan's 12 10 31 5 79 237 71 460.3 
Chili's 18 2 N A 43 626 21 1.555 
Piueria Uno Chicago 18 2 N A 86 155 94 308.4 
OulbackSteakhouse 13 8 11.7 47 574 18 1.729 
TGI Friday's 11 17 46.9 58 452 24 1,334 
Dunktn Donuts 4 200 19.5 13 3.650 15 2.007 
Baskin-Robbins 1 460 29.7 18 2,438 57 573.3 
Source of units and sales in Korea: Korean Restaurant Associaton. 2000 
5o:ce c l  . S .I a d n o  s , ~ s o d l o  \al ons  &slz .rail h ~ h s  ..re 26 2:3C Trs h R h  u?la r 6 r o n c ' ~ d r ~  l!r IC 
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Managers of the three different 
segments of Korcan restaurants, 
traditional Korean food, fast food, 
and family and dinner house, were 
selected for an interview. The 12 
restaurants included one tradi- 
tional Korcan food restaurant, two 
hamburger fast food restaurants, 
two pizza restaurants, two chicken 
restaurants, and five family and 
dinner house restaurants. The 
majority were western chain 
restaurants. 
Positive impact recognized 
Managers participating in the 
focus group interview recognized 
the following positive impacts of 
western food senrice firms on the 
Korean food service industry: 
Enriching dining out: The 
entrance of western restaurants 
enabled local diners toget new expo- 
sure to diverse choices in dining-out 
experiences, while encouraging local 
restaurant managers to benchmark 
from western restaurants. Many 
Korean restaurant managers recog- 
nized that they were not able to 
compete with their traditional 
management style. They thought 
that food taste and quality were the 
keys for success, but they underesti- 
mated other important factors such 
as atmosphere, interior design, 
service, cleanliness, etc. They even- 
tually recognized that restaurants 
existed to cater not only to hungry 
people, but for social activity 
purposes as well. 
mom-and-pop establishments 
found they could not compete 
effectively against a huge local 
restaurant, international chain, 
or domestic chain restaurant. 
Regardless of the rapid increase 
in the number of stand-alone 
restaurants, the proportion of 
restaurants whose owners 
directly participated in manage- 
ment decreased from 22.3 
percent in 1982 to 12.9 percent in 
1 9 9 1 . T h i s  fact reflects that  
many small eating places had 
become large local restaurants 
affiliated with prominent local 
restaurant chains. 
Some larger corporations 
entered the food service industry 
as a diversification strategy 
by becoming master franchisers 
of mostly western restaurant 
companies. The conglomerate's 
motivation to participate in the 
food service industry with multiple 
brands was the positive cash flow 
created by restaurant operations 
and real estate investments. 
Wealthy individuals, conglomer- 
ates, and institutions tend 
to invest in land to benefit from 
the appreciation of real estate, 
while they have to pay large 
amounts of tax for unused land. 
By building restaurants on the 
vacant land, landowners were 
able to take advantage of both 
the constant cash flow and 
significantly reduce their tax 
burdens. 
The three typical firms partici- 
Stimulating growth: The pating in the food service iddustry 
average square footage of restau- were food-related companies, retail 
rants tended to increase. Many companies, and hotels. Food produc- 
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tion, manufacturing, and supplier 
firms already had some business 
relationships with the food service 
industry; therefore, it was rela- 
tively easy to establish new finns. 
Hotels had the expertise in oper- 
ating upscale food and beverage 
outlets; it was therefore a natural 
strategy for them to  expand by 
establishing free-standing restau- 
rants outside the hotels. 
Effective management: 
When western food service firms 
entered the Korean market, they 
were initially perceived as a 
threat to traditional Korean 
restaurant operators. Korean 
food service enterprises learned 
western ways of efficiently oper- 
ating restaurants. Franchising 
played an important role in 
seeking replications of advanced 
management techniques and 
strategies. Management innova- 
tion became an important ingre- 
dient for successful restaurant 
operations even though Korean 
food service managers tradition- 
ally did not place much emphasis 
on it. 
Included among the most 
successful local chain restaurants 
was Nolbu Korean traditional 
restaurant. Its history started 
with a small Korean restaurant 
selling boiled pork in 1987, and 
within two years it launched 
its first franchise operation. 
Currently Nolbu operates and 
franchises more than six different 
concept restaurants featuring 
traditional Korean cuisine. 
Menus consist of purely tradi- 
tional Korean fare that is rooted 
in traditional home-style recipes. 
Nolbu Korean restaurant's 
success is attributed to the appli- 
cation of western scientific 
management techniques into 
Korean traditional food opera- 
tions. Its expansion in terms of 
the number of franchised units 
and sales has skyrocketed. Since 
Nolbu is not competing against 
many western chain restaurants, 
its market position among Korean 
restaurants is superior. 
Manuals and technology: 
Traditional Korean food service 
operators were astonished by the 
introduction of manuals that clearly 
explained the overall operational 
processes! Stimulated by interna- 
tional chain restaurants' sophisti- 
cated operating manuals, 
traditional Korean restaurants 
started developing their own. In 
addition, many Korean conglomer- 
ates entered the food service 
industry with franchise contracts 
with famous western restaurants 
because they considered food service 
as a profitable business. In order to 
survive the competition of famous 
western restaurants, many local 
restaurants developed their own 
brands and expanded with local 
franchising. Technological advances 
of western restaurants have led to 
sophisticated business controls and 
established franchise systems. In 
addition, well-organized manuals of 
employee training, food production, 
menu design and layout, and store 
opening were important lessons for 
local operators. 
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New market niche: Since 
western food service chains intro- 
duced the take-out concept, the 
take-out business became more 
popular and a variety of foods were 
developed for take-out. Tradition- 
ally, Chinese restaurants used to be 
the provider of most popular take- 
out or delivery food in Korea, but 
fast-food restaurants serving pizza, 
chicken, and hamburgers expanded 
rapidly by offering take-out or 
dclivery services. In addition, 
diverse local cuisines such as 
Kimbap, a kind of California roll, 
and a variety of noodle dishes were 
developed and served more often by 
take-out 
Reduced labor costs: Tradi- 
tionally small eating places were 
considered as one of the least 
popular places to work. The 
restaurant industry was often 
perceived as a gateway for 
unskilled workers; as a result, the 
employee turnover rate in the 
food service industry was known 
to be one of the highest. However, 
this trend was reversed when 
western food service operators 
started offering effective training 
programs, with trainees exposed 
to various functions related to the 
management of operations, sani- 
tation, service, human resources, 
basic equipment maintenance 
and operations, restaurant 
cashing out, and record-keeping. 
The adoption of these ongoing 
employee training programs 
aided in reducing the high 
turnover rate. A dramatic 
increase in the percentage of part- 
time employees reduced labor 
Kim and Chon 
costs and improved the bottom 
line figure. 
Survivor cases presented 
Despite the diaculty of identi- 
fylng primary reasons of success, 
some key factors of survival of 
western and local chain restau- 
rants could be identified by restau- 
rant managers. 
Localization of services: 
TGIF translated more than 100 
operating and training manuals 
into Korean to take full advantage 
of the expertise of the parent 
company. TGIF succeeded in local- 
izing its service standards by 
adjusting to local customs and 
culture. For example, TGIF 
crcoted a new ordering method, 
"kneel-down" service, rather than 
the traditional western stand-up 
ordering method. TGIF developed 
many local menu items to appeal 
to Korean guests. Kimchi rice 
pilaf, the Bulgogi set menu, and 
Bibimpap (a dish with rice and 
several vegetables) are the most 
popular items developed by TGIF 
in Korea and sold throughout TGIF 
outlets in other countries. The 
success of Marche, introduced from 
Switzerland, could be partly 
attributed to the effort of catering 
to local taste preferences. 
Marche has been very flexible in 
developing and changing its orig- 
inal recipe in order to improve 
guest satisfaction. 
A success case as a local 
brand was Spaghettia, an Italian- 
style restaurant. Its primary 
reason for success was the trade 
secret of its recipes that changed 
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original Italian flavors with some 
major adaptations, including 
developing its thin sauce and 
serving larger portions of sauces 
to cater to local preferences. In 
addition, Spaghettia consistently 
used the best quality ingredients 
regardless of the relatively high 
food cost ratio. 
BBQ Chicken, Inc. originated 
from a fast food concept that 
specializes in providing quick, 
convenient, varied chicken entrees 
such as fried, hot wing, barbecued, 
smoked, Cajun-style, nuggets, gold 
fingers, burgers, and side dishes. 
The BBQ name does not represent 
the traditional western-style 
barbeque restaurant theme, but 
more of a combination of several 
western style operations such as 
KFC, Popeye's, and others. BBQ 
achieved enormous growth since 
1994 and became the leading 
Korean chain restaurant in the 
number of units offering fast food 
chicken items. Its success was 
mainly attributed to the develop- 
ment of its appealing spicy hot 
sauce which met the taste prefer- 
ences of local guests, thereby 
attracting repeat customers. 
- Cost controls: With the 
completion of a central kitchen in 
1992, TGIF reduced food costs from 
40 to 30 percent. Marketing activi- 
ties such as sending birthday cards, 
using coupons, and issuing mileage 
and point cards were very 
successful. Nolbu Korean restau- 
rant is a typical example of success 
by adopting an American manage- 
ment technique, which led to a 
dramatic food cost reduction. Nolbu 
was able to reduce food costs from 30 
percent to 20 percent by developing 
a database of recipes of Korean 
cuisines. Previously, local restaura- 
teurs adopted best practices from 
the excellent western operational 
systems. 
Product and service quality: 
Mister Pizza, a typical success 
story of a local chain with sales of 
US$13 million in 2000, has built a 
good reputation based on its tasty 
pizza. By implementing an exten- 
sive research and development 
program to better serve the local 
taste, Mister Pizza succeeded in 
developing hand-toasted dough, 
which was less greasy and tasted 
fresher. The chain also introduced 
a new potato pizza menu that 
became a popular item, and was 
later imitated by Pizza Hut and 
other competitors. 
All foods of March6 are selected 
and produced in front of guests so 
most employees have cooking skills 
as well as the ability to function as 
wait staff. The primary goal of 
Marche is to serve fresh food and to 
have a consistent supply of fresh 
food items. The atmosphere is very 
casual with old market styie; a 
variety of people like the open atmo- 
sphere. Marche offers a wide variety 
of items including fresh salad and 
baked goods, as well as Japanese, 
Chinese, Korean, and other ethnic 
foods. March6 is well known for 
keeping the menu lifecycle as short 
as possible and taking advantage of 
a wide variety of menus as compared 
to other western family chains. 
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Finding good locations: 
Slarbucks' success was attributed to 
its strategies in locations, capital- 
izing on locations with high traffic 
flow and easy access fmm mass 
transportation such as subway and 
bus, which appealed to younger 
customers. A similar strategy 
worked well for other chains. 
The BBQ chain was known to 
be good at  finding the right loca- 
tions and utilizing a unique posi- 
tioning strategy. BBQ opened 
many small units in residential 
areas and others were located close 
to educational institutes, while 
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) 
opened spacious units in relatively 
established locations with a high 
volume of traffic. RBQ expanded 
very rapidly in t e r n  of number of 
units, but the average size of the 
unit was very small compared to its 
major competitor, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken. In 2000 BBQ operated 
1,320 units while Kentucky Fried 
Chicken had 206 units. 
Effective investment 
strategy: The success of Spaghettia 
was partly attributed toits relatively 
efficient investment strategy. In 
order to minimize costs, most units 
chose basement locations with 
savings of almost half the rental 
costs, while most other family chains 
were located on the first or second 
floor. Spaghettia offset its location 
disadvantages with massive 
marketing and promotion efforts. 
Non-survivor cases presented 
Managers identified some key 
factors for t,he failure of western 
restaurant chains. 
High pricing strategy: 
Denny's concept adjustment efforts 
with a high pricing strategy 
conflicted with its original American 
concept. Many local guests had 
dined at  1J.S. outlets and their 
perception of reasonable prices did 
not match the hgh  pricing strategy 
in Korea. Denny's price positioning 
in Korea was close to the range of 
other U.S. family and dinner house 
chains. Many clients preferred to go 
to other restaurants aRer their first 
visit to Denny's in Korea because its 
price-value relationship was much 
lower than what they expe~ted.~ 
Poor management: Wait 
staffs service and cooking skills in 
the production area were not up to 
par partly due to lack of a consistent 
employee training program by 
Denny's. Employee morale was 
quite low due to ineffective compen- 
sation and a promotion policy that 
was based on seniority. The capa- 
bilities of management staff were 
not suficient enough to compete 
against other major U.S. chain 
restaurants in K0rea.l 
Poor marketing strategy: 
Denny's marketing effort was not 
creative and oRen imitated other 
competitors. The special events 
Denny's prepared were not popular 
due to lack of creativity. Failure of 
its promotional effort was partially 
due to the lack of harmony between 
employees in the marketing depart- 
ment and each outlet's guest 
contact employees. 
Poor location: When 
Planet Hollywood was first intro- 
duced in Korea, it had the mass 
media spotlight even before 
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opening with large crowds gath- 
ering for the ceremony. An inap- 
propriate location without a 
subway line and with heavy traffic 
congestion was key in the failure of 
Planet Hollywood. This was a good 
example for US.-based chains to 
learn from since it withdrew from 
business within seven months. 
Many guests visiting Planet Holly- 
wood complained about insufficient 
parking spaces which inconve- 
nienced guests and prevented 
many from becoming repeat 
customers. 
Lack of thorough feasi- 
bility study: Excessive capital 
expenditures without a thorough 
feasibility study implied the fore- 
seeable failure of Planet Hollywood 
in Korea. Its initial investment was 
approximately US$7 to 8 million. 
In order to attain break-even sales, 
daily revenue should have been at 
least US$50,000 or the equivalent 
to 10 turnovers. Extremely heavy 
initial opening costs and normal 
operating costs caused the high 
break-even point. 
Failure of cost control: 
Planet Hollywood management 
failed to control labor costs at the 
outset. The restaurant opened with 
approximately 300 full-time 
employees, and labor productivity 
declined as customer counts 
decreased. It failed because of inad- 
equate cost controls and lower- 
than-expected sales. 
Failure to adjust to local 
taste: Cooks in the production area 
failed to adjust to local tastes 
because most food recipes were 
benchmarked from the Planet 
Hollywood in Hong Kong. Korean 
customers have very different food 
tastes from those of Hong Kong 
even though they are located in the 
same Pacific Rim area. Most foods 
were too salty and contained too 
much oil for local taste preferences, 
but management did not catch the 
problem in a timely manner. 
Competition exists 
The Korean food service 
industry showed dramatic growth 
over the last several decades. Up 
to 1996 all segments of the food 
service industry grew because of 
the significant increase of food- 
away-from-home expenditures, 
increased incomes, and people's 
increased interest in food. In the 
1980s western fast food chains 
were forerunners in launching 
brands in Korea, and in the 1990s 
many western family steakhouse 
and dinner house restaurant 
chains entered the market. 
Western restaurant chains 
provided clean facilities, quality 
services, great atmospheres, and 
systematic management that was 
astonishing to local customers who 
had never experienced them 
before. Beginning in 1998 the 
Korean economy went through an 
economic recession and the food 
service industry faced stiff compe- 
tition. Some segments still show 
strong growth, but some exhibit a 
decline. 
Even though the overall food 
service market is more competi- 
tive than ever before, there is still 
enough room for new chains to 
introduce concepts. Since most 
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western restaurants were fast food 
or dinner house chains, new 
concept restaurants such as theme 
restaurants are expected to have 
great appeal if introduced. Many 
other top American chains such as 
Applebee's, Olive Garden, Red 
Lobster, and International House 
of Pancake (IHOP) have not yet 
been introduced. The reason may 
be that some of those chains still 
have ample growth opportunities 
in the United States, giving them 
little motivation to expand into 
Korea. In addition, since they are 
very successful chains, their 
royalty fee structure may be too 
high for local partners. However, 
American chain restaurants may 
still have more expansion opportu- 
nities in Asia. Coco's and Tony 
Roma's found new life in Asia 
when the brand's popularity began 
to decline in the United States. 
A number of premier U.S. 
chains keep dominating market 
share, while others are not market 
leaders; some chains have with- 
drawn from the market entirely 
The key elements of survivors were 
localization of services and opera- 
tions, effective management, 
leading to cost control, product and 
service quality, good locations, and 
an eflective investment strategy. 
The key elements of non-survivors 
were inappropriate concept modifi- 
cation with a high pricing strategy, 
poor management and lack of 
consistent employee training, poor 
marketing strategy, poor location, 
lack of thorough feasibility study, 
failure of cost control, and failure 
to adjust local taste. 
Understanding the key non- 
survival elements could help 
western food service finns reduce 
their chances of business failure 
during their expansion movement in 
Korea as well as in other Asian 
markets. Even in the same Pacific 
Rim regions, for example, some 
chains succeeded in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, but could not succeed in 
Japan and Korea. It is important for 
western restaurant chains to do a 
more in-depth analysis of each 
country, even within the same 
geographic regions. A more compre- 
hensive understanding of unique 
cultures, food habits, and local 
tastes of each country will be helpful 
for western chains to successfully 
expand into Asia. Another impor- 
tant factor for Korea and other 
Asian markets is the extent to which 
newcomers can or should m o w  
original concepts and recipes to 
meet local needs and tastes! 
Reviewing more accurate and 
comprehensive success and failure 
cases could be invaluable resources 
for those restaurant finns planning 
to expand into foreign countries. 
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